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A philosophical analysis on the relations between recognition and indignation 
 
Sonia París Albert  
  
 
 
Hegel’s famous claim that “Philosophy is the child of its time” touches on how 
Philosophy incorporates new social issues that affect the lives of human beings. One of 
the main characteristics of philosophical thought, and a main line of research in classic 
and current philosophical works, lies in its contribution to explore how people face the 
risks, vicissitudes and changes that life presents. Love of wisdom, the search for 
wanting to know more, the radical continuous thinking that Socrates speaks of and that 
is at the core of Philosophy are attitudes that encourage the capacity for indignation. 
Only when we question reality, when we reflect and wonder about what occurs to us or 
to others and its causes, can we have a better understanding of the pros and cons of our 
claims and can therefore come up with nonviolent actions to undertake. From this 
conviction, I would like to display the points of view of a Philosophy for Peace, an 
applied Philosophy with the objective of empowering our human capacities for 
transforming human and environmental suffering by peaceful means.  Hence, this essay 
aims at reflecting on the significance of “indignation,” as it has recently emerged in 
social protest movements in Spain and elsewhere, from the genealogy of the notion of 
recognition. 
 
In an increasingly difficult economic and social crisis in Spain, it is of utmost 
importance to reflect upon how the mass media routinely repeats a limited economic 
discourse to analyze and justify a range of social cutbacks which are provoking 
numerous civil protests. These protests demonstrate a growing indignation in the face of 
the restriction of economic, educational, health and other social policies. At the same 
time, they also show emerging practices of mutual recognition within civil society. In 
this scenario, as in the past, Philosophy has a role to play. Specifically, it can provide us 
with critical perspectives and entry points to address the crises in values as well as the 
outcomes of the economic crisis we are experiencing everywhere, even if within distinct 
historical, cultural and political conditions. In this essay, I aim to explore one particular 
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avenue of a Philosophy for Peace in this time of indignation in Spain:  the debates on 
recognition to address the relationship between nonviolent social movements and social 
justice. 
Approaching the complexity of present-day situations from the practical and 
applied significance of philosophical reflections has become a distinctive trend in 
Philosophy. At the UNESCO Chair in Castellón we have proposed to explore normative 
instruments that are able to include the perspective of feelings and affection for the 
nonviolent transformation of conflicts. This interest in developing a “practical 
rationality” dialogues with a considerable rise in recent years of literature focusing on 
indignation and the empowerment of social movements. Indignation is increasingly 
highlighted in these philosophical and Peace Studies publications as a main element in 
the struggles for mutual recognition in nonviolent protest movements.  
Social movements like the 15M that began to articulate efforts in 2011, also 
known as the “indignants' movement” and “the Spanish revolution,” call for real 
participatory democracies in which the voice of civil society has a greater and more 
decisive role regarding policies of the state. They propose specific initiatives and ways 
to recognize and incorporate people’s needs, rights and participation into social policies. 
These nonviolent calls, actions and networks bring out the sense of citizenship from 
people´s feelings and show the importance of mutual recognition, dialogue and caring. 
In this era of globalization, new media quickens time, reduces geographical distance and 
favors connectivity and organizing strategies in civil society. It might also activate a 
sense of mutual recognition and responsibility. Immediacy and access to multiple 
sources of information may lead to increasing misunderstandings; yet, it is also true that 
it raises awareness about diverse issues that may cause feelings of indignation. 
In etymological terms (from the Latin prefix re and the verb cognoscere), the 
word recognition means, “to know again.” Accordingly, “recognizing” a person means 
knowing more about him or her and understanding that person in depth, paying 
attention to his or hers idiosyncrasies. It is like a re-look, a “stop and look more 
closely,” a “taking that person into account.” Thus, a person who feels indignation does 
so, among other reasons, because he or she does not feel recognized or because he or 
she sees that the identities, opinions, difficulties or needs of other individuals have not 
been recognized. Therefore, the feeling of indignation empowers the figure of the 
indignant to organize nonviolent social movements in pursuit of mutual recognition. In 
this way, critical nonviolent social movements promote a peaceful transformation of the 
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social structures that cause injustice and inequality. This is so when they arise from the 
belief that the absence of recognition causes inequalities and, consequently, social 
injustice. Therefore, if these nonviolent social movements result in the increase of 
mutual recognition as the basis for social justice, as philosopher Axel Honneth argues, 
they will have an influence in the decrease of those inequalities.  
As human beings, we have peaceful alternatives to transform our indignation. 
Vicent Martínez Guzmán’s Philosophy for Peace and his proposal of an 
Epistemological Turn emphasizes this capacity to act peacefully and to transform our 
fragility and vulnerability by nonviolent means. Of course, we can feel fragile and 
vulnerable in our indignation due to a lack of recognition of ours and other’s rights, and 
we certainly can respond to this fragility in a violent way. However, we can catalyze 
this indignation peacefully as in the case of social movement organized around 
nonviolent, innovative and dialogic interventions. I support this move towards mutual 
recognition because I believe it can play an important role in ending spirals of violence 
and enhancing attitudes nurturing cultures for peace.  
 
Feeling indignant means feeling angry about something that has happened or that 
someone has done and that we consider unjust. Philosophy for Peace theoretical lens 
facilitates a reflection on the diverse possibilities for enhancing our capacities for the 
peaceful transformation of the structures, policies and actions that maintain social 
injustice. However, before we are able to express our indignation and struggle 
nonviolently for social justice, we must face and transform culturally constructed 
feelings of fear. The individual and social effects of fear have been deeply and broadly 
analyzed from many different perspectives. Benjamin Barber’s Fear’s Empire: War, 
Terrorism and Democracy provides a good example of this line of research. Barber 
argues that our capacity of feeling indignation and transforming it is related to the 
concept of freedom as an absence of fear. Thus, a first step towards indignation will be 
overcoming fear and not falling into its trap. Fear hinders our potential as citizens to act 
and favors the status quo. In contrast, living without fear means being able to make 
ourselves visible, make ourselves heard, openly expressing our indignation through 
actions calling for changes. Only in freedom and without fear can civil society make its 
indignation visible and give us the chance of peacefully and non-violently organizing 
critical social movements against unjust political and economic policies.  
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The concept of indignation I am putting forward here is rooted in Peter Frederick 
Strawson’s Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays, where he explores a 
Phenomenology of moral feelings. He distinguishes three attitudes that human beings 
can adopt in everyday life when they experience contempt, disrespect or indifference. 
Let me say that this distinction opens to a consideration of feelings that plays a 
significant role in the ways we conceptualize recognition and responsibility. Vicent 
Martínez Guzmán has elaborated on these three perspectives to propose that they imply 
an “originary intersubjectivity” through which we can be held responsible to each other 
for what we say and do: how do I feel about what others do to me; how do I feel about 
what I do; and how do I feel about what others do to third parties. It is well known that 
Strawson situates the feeling of indignation in the second relation. However, my 
reflection of present-day indignant movements requires broadening these perspectives 
by opening up the possibility of feeling indignant in any of the aforementioned three 
levels of relations. A person may feel indignant by the offensive actions that others do 
to each other (even though they do not affect him or her) as much as for those 
perpetrated against him or herself.  
I would like to argue that indignation is closely related to mutual recognition 
insofar as the three perspectives of feelings are involved. The lack of recognition a 
person feels in relation to him or herself, or to other people, provokes indignation. 
Feelings, therefore, regain an important role and value in philosophical theory. Axel 
Honneth in Pathologies of Reason reflects on how Modern society manifests a 
pathological deformation of rational human faculties that cause human and 
environmental suffering. This suffering is due to the concepts of structural, cultural and 
direct violence insofar as they are actions generating social injustices and inequalities.  
 
The absence of mutual recognition provokes indignation. A person may feel deeply 
indignant if he or she is not recognized or if she or he feels that other people are being 
degraded or treated with contempt. The importance of mutual recognition is explained 
by dialectic thought, such as Fichte’s claim that in recognizing “you” I also recognize 
“myself.” In that moment of the process of recognition, I acknowledge the traits we 
have in common and the ones that make us different. For instance, Paul Ricoeur, in his 
book The Course of Recognition, has emphasized that mutual recognition always 
implies an interrelation. 
5 
 
This philosophical debate is also elaborated in Honneth’s writings. In his work 
The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts, Honneth 
analyzes the relation between the absence of mutual recognition and the organization of 
nonviolent social movements. Applying Honneth’s terminology, one feels indignation at 
realizing that I feel responsible when someone is not recognized or when there is a lack 
of recognition for others. I believe indignation is also the reason nonviolent social 
movements are empowered and organized around the objective of achieving mutual 
recognition. It implies that indignation always relates to an interpersonal or even 
dialogical dimension based on reciprocal responsibility. However, following a 
Philosophy for Peace approach, I would argue that indignation is a force to organize the 
nonviolent social movements in terms of what Honneth has called struggles for 
recognition, putting an end to Hobbes and Machiavelli’s struggles for self-preservation.  
Honneth distinguishes three kinds of mutual recognition: recognition of our 
physical integrity, necessary for our self-confidence and linked to attitudes that arise 
within the domain of love; recognition that we have rights and duties as members of a 
legal community, necessary for our self-respect and linked to attitudes connected with 
respect; and recognition of our different and particular lifestyles, necessary for our self-
esteem and linked to attitudes that arise within the domain of solidarity and tolerance. 
From the philosophical perspective, self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem are 
three values for which people that feel indignation struggle.  
 
Honneth’s emphasis on the value of mutual recognition for social justice is a pillar for 
the philosophical analysis of indignation. I would also like to acknowledge other 
positions for the achievement of social justice, such as the debate between Nancy Fraser 
and Honneth himself in Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical 
Exchange. Fraser defends the necessary combination between distributive policies and 
recognition to achieve social justice in contrast with Honneth’s focus on normativity in 
his recognition theory. 
Furthermore, Peace Studies has shown that the study of indignation in 
nonviolent social movements should not be limited to philosophical approaches, but 
also implies an interdisciplinary intervention. The idea that Philosophy has an 
imperative to build up a practical approach, as proposed by a Philosophy for Peace, 
needs to be compared and discussed through pedagogical projects based on the 
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possibilities that philosophical thought can help us imagine ways for transforming our 
realities. As Paulo Freire argues in his touchstone works, Pedagogy of Indignation, 
Pedagogy of the Oppressed and Pedagogy of Hope, we can learn to approach social 
injustice through non-violent social movements by incorporating mutual recognition 
into the processes of empowerment of the oppressed to transform the oppressive 
situations they suffer. These movements reveal and transform the unjust structures of 
society by broadening the philosophical dimension of everyday debates to other actors, 
not because they are directly oppressed by them, but because they are indignant in the 
face of injustice.  
This awakened indignation interplays with hope and relates to freedom, 
contrasting with the social, media and cultural construction of fear I discussed earlier. 
As coined by Bertrand Russell, hope is a “propositional attitude” that when linked to 
indignation and guided by mutual recognition allows us to believe that change for the 
better and nonviolent approaches are possible. Of course these are dialogic and 
transformative processes in which conflicts arise. But these conflicts need to be faced 
through mutual learning. As Freire argues, these processes give us the opportunity to 
problematize, to work through problems, using debate and dialogue, and to mutually 
recognize all participants as having active roles.  
 
As stated above, a Philosophy for Peace focuses on citizen participation and is 
concerned with the ways in which human relationships are generated, not as a product 
of instrumental rationality, but as a field infused with and incorporating feelings and 
affection. I believe that these feelings should be approached through a paradigm of 
intersubjectivity, which accounts for the necessary interrelation among people as social 
beings able to develop competences and abilities for making peace(s) and transforming 
conflicts. Furthermore, it re-evaluates the importance of feelings, such as the feeling of 
indignation, in order to recuperate them for our understanding of the transformation of 
social conflicts and struggles for social justice. Feelings have been usually understood 
in the private sphere and have been denied in the public space. However, a Philosophy 
for Peace considers that it is necessary to take them into account because of their 
cultural, political and structural role in our acts and resulting personal and cultural 
relations.  
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The paradigm of intersubjectivity and the re-evaluation of feelings are two 
points that let us put into question the modern concept of Reason, which is based on a 
universalistic pattern (usually understood from a European, white and masculine frame). 
In contrast, a Philosophy for Peace invites us to recuperate possible alternative 
perspectives and feelings “in the diversity of the others” by means of dialogue, 
interpellation and interrelation. Accounting for the intersubjective character of relations 
and the revaluation of feelings is relevant as they show us our capability of indignation. 
This task demands us to challenge philosophical and social thought and produce 
innovative narratives of today´s conflicts and its nonviolent transformation.   
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